To: David Chen (CFO), Marcus Kim (CIO)
From: Dr. Priya Sharma, Head of Data & Analytics
Re: What our data can and cannot support before we contract a pricing engine
I support the initiative. I want to be equally clear about where our data stands today, because pricing is precise and high-stakes: an automated wrong price is public, instant, and can read as either gouging or a margin-destroying error. We should not contract a vendor on the assumption that our data is ready, because it is not.
1. We lack a clean competitor price feed
Effective dynamic pricing on a fashion and homewares assortment depends heavily on knowing where competitors sit. We do not have this. We have ad-hoc manual price checks done by category buyers: patchy, inconsistent, and weeks stale. There is no automated, structured, matched feed of competitor prices against our SKUs.
2. Demand signals are split across online and store
Our online demand data (Shopify Plus) is clean and granular. Our in-store demand data sits in a 10–15 year old POS and inventory stack and is coarse, batch-loaded overnight, and not reliably joined to the same SKU and customer keys.
| Signal | Online | Store (legacy POS) |
|---|---|---|
| Granularity | Per-event, real-time | Daily batch, aggregated |
| SKU keying | Consistent | ~14% mismatch / unmapped |
| Price elasticity history | Usable | Sparse, unreliable |
A model trained mostly on online behaviour will mis-price in stores, which are still ~65% of revenue. Reconciling these two worlds is foundational work, not a configuration step.
3. Backtest performance is not live performance
Recommendation
- Sequence a competitor-feed acquisition project before, not after, engine selection.
- Fund the online/store data reconciliation as a named workstream.
- Treat any vendor backtest as marketing until validated on a live, capped pilot.
- Plan for 12+ months to a credible, trusted rollout. The Board's "this year" margin expectation is not realistic at full scope.
Dr. Priya Sharma, Head of Data & Analytics